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 1 
THE RETENTION OF FINGERPRINTS AND SAMPLES FOLLOWING 
ACQUITTAL OR WHEN PROCEEDINGS ARE DISCONTINUED 
 
R v (1) Chief Constable of South Yorkshire (2) Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, ex p. S: R v (1) Chief Constable of South Yorkshire (2) Secretary of State 
for the Home Department, ex p. Marper [2002] EWCA Civ 1275, LTL 12/9/2002 
 
Introduction and Background 
 
The advent of DNA profiling and its development into an incredibly powerful 
forensic technique continues to raise both legal and moral issues. The Royal 
Commission on Criminal Justice1 (RCCJ) recommended amending the law in order to 
facilitate the creation of a national DNA database. These recommendations were 
reflected in the provisions of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994,2 which 
came into force in April 1995. These provisions amended the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) in order to enable samples suitable for DNA profiling to 
be taken without consent3 and to increase significantly the offences for which such 
samples could be taken.4 In addition to amending the law in relation to the 
classification and taking of samples the 1994 Act also amended s.64 PACE relating to 
                                                 
1 The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (July 1993) Cm 2263, HMSO. 
2 Sections 54-58 
3 This was achieved by reclassifying saliva and mouth swabs as non-intimate samples. 
4 This was achieved in two ways: firstly, by amending the offences for which non-intimate samples 
could be taken without consent from serious arrestable to recordable offences (going further than the 
recommendations of the RCCJ); and secondly, by extending the circumstances in which such samples 
could be taken to include persons charged with or informed they will be reported for a recordable 
offence and from persons convicted of a recordable offence.  
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the destruction of samples. These amendments did not significantly alter the 
provisions in relation to the destruction of samples but did clarify the law in relation 
to the retention of information derived from a sample. Both before and after the 
amendments, s.64 contained a requirement that samples be destroyed as soon as 
practical after an individual was acquitted of the offence,5 or after a decision was 
taken not to prosecute.6 However, following the amendments, there was a requirement 
that where samples were required to be destroyed information derived from the 
sample of any person entitled to its destruction should not be used in evidence against 
the person or for the purposes of any investigation of an offence7.  
 
These provisions could be interpreted as an attempt to restore the position of the 
person charged, but later acquitted or against whom proceedings were dropped, to the 
same position as that of an individual who had not been charged in the first place. The 
sample would be destroyed and the information derived from it could not be used 
against that person in the future. This position is attractive in that if we truly believe 
in the principle that an individual is innocent until proven guilty why should they not 
be in the same position that they would have been had they not come into contact with 
the criminal justice system in the first place. 
 
However, two high profile cases, R v B; Attorney General’s Reference No 3 of 19998 
and R v Weir,9 indicated a problem with this approach. In both cases the individuals 
                                                 
5 Section 64(1) 
6 Section 64(2) 
7 Section 64(3B) 
8 [2001] 1 All ER 577 
9 [2001] Crim LR 656  
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concerned were implicated in serious offences (rape and murder respectively) by 
information (DNA profiles) derived from samples that should have been destroyed 
following an acquittal and the dropping of proceedings for more minor offences.  In R 
v B the defendant was identified as a suspect for an offence of rape following a match 
between a DNA profile obtained from a sample taken in respect of a burglary, of 
which the defendant had been acquitted, and a DNA profile obtained from a sample 
recovered from the rape victim. Following this initial identification of the suspect a 
new sample was taken and the DNA profile compared with that from the rape victim. 
It was this match that was presented at court but the sample from the burglary, of 
which the defendant had been acquitted, had been used in the investigation contrary to 
s.64(3B)(b) of PACE. The trial judge ruled the DNA evidence inadmissible on the 
ground that s.64(3B)(b) provided that samples required to be destroyed under s.64 (1) 
‘shall not be used …for the purposes of any investigation of an offence’ and directed 
an acquittal. On a subsequent reference by the Attorney General the Court of Appeal 
upheld the judge’s ruling on admissibility, holding that s.64(3B) was mandatory. The 
House of Lords, reversing the decision of the Court of Appeal, held that a breach of 
s.64(3B) would not automatically render evidence inadmissible as a matter of law but 
would be a matter for the judge’s discretion under s.78 PACE10. This decision was in 
line with the approach taken towards improperly obtained evidence; it is not normally 
inadmissible as a matter of law but may be excluded as the judge’s discretion. 
However, the fact remained that, despite very cogent forensic evidence, in R v B the 
                                                 
10 s78 (1) ‘In any proceedings the court may refuse to allow evidence on which the prosecution 
proposes to rely to be given if it appears to the court that, having regard to all the circumstances, 
including the circumstances in which the evidence was obtained, the admission of the evidence would 
have such an adverse affect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it.’ 
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defendant was acquitted of rape and in Weir a defendant initially convicted of murder 
had his conviction quashed on appeal. 
 
The Attorney General’s reference was heard by the House of Lords in December 2000 
and in January 2001 the Home Secretary introduced amendments to the relevant 
sections of PACE in the House of Commons. These amendments became law in May 
2001 when the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 gained Royal Assent. Section 82 
of this Act amends s.64 PACE to permit the retention of fingerprints and samples 
from those subsequently acquitted or against whom proceedings are dropped. It 
provides that fingerprints or samples retained in these circumstances or the 
information derived from such samples may be used for purposes related to the 
prevention or detection of crime, the investigation of an offence or the conduct of a 
prosecution. This is clearly a significant change in the law permitting, for example, a 
DNA profile from a sample taken in relation to an offence of which the defendant has 
been acquitted to be used in the investigation of subsequent offences. In addition, 
these changes have retrospective effect in that subsection (6) permits the retention and 
use of fingerprints and samples the destruction of which should have taken place 
before the commencement of s.82 and use of information from such samples11. 
 
Due to the far-reaching, and to some extent controversial, nature of these amendments 
it is perhaps not surprising that the issue has come before the courts. 
 
                                                 
11 This could relate to a significant number of samples. The Guardian, September 1, 2000 reported that 
50,000 samples that should have been destroyed were still in existence.  
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The Facts 
 
S v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire 
In January 2001 S, a boy 12 years of age, had his fingerprints and samples for DNA 
profiling taken following his arrest and charge with attempted robbery. He had no 
previous convictions, cautions or warnings. On June 14 2001, he was acquitted of the 
offence. On July18 2001, South Yorkshire Police wrote a letter to the solicitors acting 
on behalf of S, explaining that in accordance with s.64 PACE (as amended by the 
Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001) the fingerprints and samples would be retained. 
The letter specifically acknowledged that the fingerprints and samples taken would 
have been due for destruction but that the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 had 
amended the law. At the time S’s fingerprints and samples were taken, in January 
2001, s.64 PACE required the destruction of such evidence as soon as practicable 
after acquittal. By the time S had been acquitted the Criminal Justice and Police Act 
2001 had come into force permitting their retention. On 24 July 2001, S’s solicitors 
wrote requesting that his fingerprints and samples be destroyed. This was followed by 
a second letter, from S’s solicitors to the Chief Constable of South Yorkshire, 
claiming that the retention constituted a breach of article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and that if the fingerprints and samples were not 
destroyed proceedings would be commenced for judicial review seeking a mandatory 
order for destruction and a declaration of incompatibility.  A further letter was sent, 
by the solicitors, arguing that, even if the legislation were compatible with article 8, 
the Chief Constable should consider the exercise of his discretion in each case and not 
adopt a blanket policy. 
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Marper v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire 
On March 13 2001 Marper was arrested and charged with harassment of his partner 
and his fingerprints and DNA samples were taken. By the time of the pre-trial review, 
on May 3 2001, his partner had decided not to press the charge. On June 11 2001, the 
Crown Prosecution Service wrote to his solicitors enclosing a notice of 
discontinuance. On June 29 2001, Marper’s solicitors wrote requesting destruction of 
the fingerprints and DNA samples. Having received the general letter from the Chief 
Constable of South Yorkshire indicating the change in s.64 and that fingerprints and 
samples would be retained, Marper’s solicitors wrote again requesting that the Chief 
Constable exercise his discretion not to retain either the fingerprints or the samples. 
The Chief Constable replied confirming that, save in exceptional circumstances, it 
was policy to retain fingerprints and samples in all cases.  
 
The Decision of the Divisional Court 
 
The Divisional Court dismissed the claims by S and Marper for judicial review of the 
decision by the Chief Constable of South Yorkshire to retain their fingerprints and 
samples lawfully taken during the course of criminal investigations. Three principal 
issues arose before the Divisional Court; firstly, is the revised s64 compatible with 
article 8; secondly, is it compatible with article 14; and thirdly, did the Chief 
Constable fetter his discretion. 
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Compatibility with Article 8 
Counsel for the claimants submitted that the retention of fingerprints and samples 
constitutes an interference with a person’s private life contrary to article 8(1) of the 
Convention.12 The Divisional Court accepted that the taking of fingerprints and 
samples for DNA profiling, both of which are capable of identifying individuals, 
could constitute an interference with an individual’s privacy capable of engaging 
article 8. However, it was less convinced that the retention of fingerprints and 
samples, lawfully taken, could infringe such a right citing McVeigh, O’Neill and 
Evans v United Kingdom.13 The claimants relied on Salonen v Finland,14 in which the 
European Commission of Human Rights recognised that the choice of forenames fell 
within the sphere of private life as this constituted a means of identifying individuals, 
arguing that fingerprints and DNA samples identified individuals and represented a 
physical aspect of their persona. The Divisional Court was not convinced by this 
analogy and was reinforced in its view by the fact that in Kinnunnen v Finland15 the 
Commission did not consider retention of photographs and fingerprints for some years 
after acquittal, of the applicant, to be a breach of article 8(1).  
 
Though not certain that retention breached article 8(1) the Divisional Court went on to 
consider, assuming that there had been a breach of article 8(1), whether such an 
interference was ‘in accordance with the law’ and ‘necessary in a democratic society 
                                                 
12 ‘Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.’ 
13 (1981) 25 DR 15 in which the European Commission of Human Rights expressly distinguished 
between the taking of fingerprints, photographs and samples and their retention, stating that it was open 
to question whether such retention was an interference with article 8(1).  
14 Application No 27868/95. 
15 Application 24950/94. 
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for the prevention of disorder or crime and for the protection of others’ as provided 
for by article 8(2). Counsel for the claimants argued that the retention was neither in 
accordance with the law nor necessary in a democratic society. The Court dismissed 
the first argument holding that the revised s.64 was neither uncertain nor lacking in 
clarity. With regard to whether the retention is necessary in a democratic society for 
the prevention of disorder or crime there were three issues: firstly, whether there is a 
need for restriction; secondly, whether the restriction corresponds to a pressing social 
need; and finally, whether the restriction is ‘proportionate’. The real issue in dispute 
was whether the restriction is proportionate. The claimant’s case was that a fair 
balance had not been struck between protecting their right to respect for their private 
life and the interests of society in preventing, investigating and prosecuting criminal 
offences. It had not been demonstrated that the retention of fingerprints and samples 
from those, with no previous convictions, acquitted or against whom proceedings 
were dropped was necessary. There was no evidence to suggest that it was necessary 
in respect of the two claimants. Counsel for the claimants submitted that they are 
presumed innocent of the charge and yet the retention creates the suspicion that they 
are not innocent. It was argued that there is a difference between retaining fingerprints 
and samples where the police have grounds for investigation of a specific individual 
for a specific offence and retaining such information because it may potentially prove 
useful in future investigations.  
 
The Divisional Court rejected this argument believing the claimants to be 
concentrating on the wrong issue. The court drew the distinction between compelling 
members of the public to provide fingerprints or samples, merely because the police 
would find them useful, and retaining fingerprints and samples lawfully obtained. The 
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court felt that the protection for the individual lies in the legislative provisions 
detailing the circumstances in which the fingerprints and samples can be taken rather 
than their destruction.  It highlighted the fact that the police are not required to destroy 
other evidence and intelligence gathered during an investigation, it is available for use 
in the future. The court concluded that the legislation relating to retention of 
fingerprints and samples is proportionate: the increase in serious crime is a pressing 
problem for society; fingerprints and DNA samples can provide powerful evidence 
against an individual; and, interference is slight. The court thus rejected that the 
revised s.64 was incompatible with article 8. 
 
Compatibility with Article 14 
The claimants argued that s.64 was incompatible with article 14,16 submitting that the 
fact that an individual ‘may’ commit an offence in the future, in the same way that 
any person without previous convictions might, cannot be ground for allowing the 
police to retain personal information. Acquitted persons should be in the same 
position as those who have neither been convicted nor are under suspicion of having 
committed a crime. The court rejected this argument and found s.64 compatible with 
article 14. The court held that all those who have lawfully been obliged to provide 
fingerprints and samples for the police are treated equally whereas those who have 
never been required to provide fingerprints or samples are not in the same position. 
Should the court be incorrect in holding this view then it was satisfied that the 
                                                 
16 ‘The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this convention shall be secured without 
discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, association with a national minority, birth or other status’. 
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retention of fingerprints and samples has a ‘legitimate aim and objective and 
reasonable justification’.17  
 
Had the Chief Constable Fettered his Discretion? 
The court accepted that the Chief Constable clearly had a discretion whether or not to 
retain fingerprints and samples.18 It was informed that the policy of the Chief 
Constable of South Yorkshire had been to retain fingerprints and samples unless there 
was a convincing distinguishing feature to the case. The court was provided with 
examples of such features eg a case where, prior to the amendments coming into 
force, a specific term of an agreement to be bound over was that the fingerprints and 
samples would be destroyed. The claimants argued that the governing principle in the 
exercise of the discretion should be features related to the individual such as age or 
the type of offence for which he was arrested. The court felt that this argument was 
flawed as the fingerprints and samples are not being retained specifically because the 
person from whom they were obtained is suspected of committing an offence, hence 
personal characteristics are not relevant. The court held that it was appropriate to 
place the burden on the person seeking an exception to the general policy and that the 
Chief Constable, through examples given to the court, had demonstrated a willingness 
to consider any request not to retain data on its merit. The Chief Constable had not 
adopted a blanket policy and had not fettered his discretion. The court could see no 
grounds for challenging the approach taken by the Chief Constable to the exercise of 
                                                 
17 Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v United Kingdom (1985) 7 EHRR 471. 
18 Section 64 1(A)’… the fingerprints or samples may be retained after they have fulfilled the purposes 
for which they were taken…’ 
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his discretion, and no reason to conclude he erred in the exercise of his discretion in 
the two cases before the court.  
 
The court recognised that the retention of fingerprints and samples by the police could 
arouse strong feelings and concerns. However, it felt that as a consequence of the 
Human Rights Act 1998 any extension of police powers could be challenged and 
tested against the provisions of the Convention. The court dismissed the applications 
holding s.64(1A) to be compatible with the Convention and that there was no ground 
for striking down the discretion exercised by the Chief Constable in relation to 
retention of fingerprints and samples either generally or specifically in the cases 
before the  court. 
The Decision of the Court of Appeal 
The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for judicial review being of the view 
that retention of the fingerprints and DNA samples of individuals who had not been 
convicted of criminal offences did not contravene either the individuals right to 
privacy under article 8 or his right not to be discriminated against under article 14. 
 
Compatibility with Article 8 
The Court of Appeal was satisfied that retention of samples was an interference with 
an individual’s privacy under article 8(1); a point that the Division Court felt was 
arguable.   Holding that retention did infringe article 8(1) the Court of Appeal, 
agreeing with the Divisional Court, held that the interference with article 8(1) is 
justified by article 8(2), the adverse consequence to the individual being proportionate 
to the benefit to the public. 
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Compatibility with Article 14 
The majority (Lord Woolf CJ and Waller LJ) held s.64 to be compatible with article 
14. Lord Woolf CJ, accepting that both those who have not been investigated and 
those who have been investigated but are no longer subject to proceedings are entitled 
to be regarded as innocent, stated that once fingerprints or samples have been lawfully 
taken there is a clear, objective distinction between individuals from whom 
fingerprints or samples have been taken and those individuals from whom they have 
not been taken. It was therefore not an improper discrimination to treat those who 
have already given fingerprints or samples differently from those who have not when 
it comes to retention of fingerprints and samples. In addition he did not consider the 
discrimination relied on in this case to be within the categories of discrimination 
referred to in article 14. He acknowledged that an undesirable consequence of holding 
s.64 to contravene article 14 could be an expansion of the circumstances in which 
fingerprints and samples could be taken and retained in order to avoid discrimination. 
Waller LJ took a slightly different approach. He agreed that there was no 
discrimination but based this on the fact that, in his opinion, the relevant pool of 
individuals was those from whom samples had been taken and all these individuals 
were treated in the same manner. 
 
Sedley LJ, dissenting in part on the question of discrimination, was of the opinion that 
the relevant pool of individuals is the unconvicted population, hence, there must be a 
justification for retaining the fingerprints and samples of those who have had 
fingerprints and samples taken but have been acquitted or are no longer subject to 
proceedings. He felt that this discrimination could fall within article 14 as to be 
charged or investigated but not convicted is both as involuntary and as stigmatic as 
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other examples within article 14. He was of the view that the discrimination was 
justified as individuals accused but acquitted or who are no longer subject to 
proceedings are not necessarily on a par with those never accused. He accepted that 
amongst those charged and acquitted there would be individuals who should never 
have been charged and would not go on to offend but that there would also be a 
significant number of individuals who would go on to offend; the proportion of such 
individuals being greater than the proportion of such individuals within the pool of 
individuals who have never been charged. He stated that not all unconvicted 
individuals are equal from a policing point of view and that the discrimination is 
therefore justified. 
 
The Chief Constable Discretion 
Lord Woolf CJ and Waller LJ were is agreement that the discretion conferred on the 
Chief Constable should be exercised in a manner consistent with the purpose for 
which it was bestowed ie prevention and detection of crime. As a consequence of this 
fingerprints and samples will normally be retained unless there are specific 
circumstances justifying an exception. In this case the Chief Constable had a policy 
permitting exceptions in exceptional circumstances. The approach of Sedley LJ was 
that the Chief Constable should consider whether the individual was free from ‘any 
taint of suspicion’ and where this was the case the fingerprints and samples should not 
be retained.  This approach was not supported by Lord Woolf CJ and Waller LJ who 
felt it inappropriate that the Chief Constable should be assessing whether the 
individual was free from suspicion following acquittal in order to make a decision 
relating to retention of fingerprints and samples.      
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Commentary 
 
The amendments to s.64 constitute a significant change in the law. Without doubt the 
larger the fingerprint and DNA databases the greater the chance that a fingerprint or 
sample from an unsolved crime will match an entry on the database and thus the 
greater the value of these databases in criminal investigations. However, this must be 
balanced by recognition of the great concern members of the public may have in 
having their fingerprints and samples retained on databases. Prior to the amendments 
the dividing line fell between those convicted of a recordable offence and those with 
no convictions; with the exception of individuals being investigated for criminal 
offences or awaiting trial. However, on acquittal or if proceedings were dropped, the 
fingerprints and samples of these individuals would be destroyed and if not destroyed 
could not be used for the investigation of offences or in evidence against them. The 
amendments have moved the dividing line, which now falls between those who have 
been investigated for an offence and those who have not. It is perhaps not surprising 
that those acquitted or against whom proceedings are dropped may feel aggrieved that 
they have not been returned to the position they were in before coming into contact 
with the criminal justice system. The amended provisions themselves show 
recognition of the unease members of the public may feel concerning the retention of 
fingerprints and samples in that they provide for fingerprints and samples taken from 
persons not suspected of having committed the offence to be destroyed. This 
provision is designed to encourage members of the public to assist in the investigation 
of offences; for example where the police wish to undertake a mass screen and ask all 
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the inhabitants of a particular geographical area to submit to the taking of samples for 
elimination purposes s.64(3)19 provides for their fingerprints and samples to be 
destroyed. Although the majority of the Court of Appeal felt there was no basis for 
arguing that the amended provisions gave rise to improper discrimination and 
interference with article 14, Sedley LJ accepted that there was a basis for arguing that 
there was discrimination. As stated above those individuals acquitted or against whom 
proceedings are dropped are not returned to the position they were in prior to the 
investigation and the taking of fingerprints and samples and acknowledgement of this 
potential discrimination should be welcomed. However, Sedley LJ felt the 
discrimination was justified on the basis that a greater proportion of individuals who 
have been charged and acquitted or against whom proceedings are dropped are likely 
to subsequently commit an offence. Hence it is in the public interest that the 
fingerprints and samples be retained. This is likely to be little comfort to those 
individuals wrongly charged and who are unlikely to come into contact with the 
criminal justice system in the future. It would appear that in an attempt to redress this 
problem Sedley LJ states that the Chief Constable could exercise his discretion not to 
retain samples where the individual is beyond suspicion. This approach was rejected 
by the majority of the Court of Appeal. It would not be appropriate for the Chief 
Constable to make a judgement on, what is in effect, the degree of innocence of the 
individual. It is perhaps not surprising that Sedley LJ stated that he found the 
                                                 
19 Section 64(3) of the act provides that if  
a) fingerprints or samples are taken from a person in connection with the 
investigation of an offence; and  
 b) that person is not suspected of having committed the offence, 
they must, except as provided in the following provisions of this section, be 
destroyed as soon as they have fulfilled the purpose for which they were taken. 
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discrimination the most difficult issue in the case. Accepting the issue of 
discrimination an alternative solution would be to expand the taking and retention of 
fingerprints and samples in order avoid discrimination, possibly leading to pressure to 
create a comprehensive database of all persons. Lord Woolf CJ highlighted the fact 
that article 14 is designed to protect human rights and yet, in these circumstances, to 
accept that the current provisions are potentially in conflict with article 14 could result 
in a wider database being established which arguably would reduce the rights of a 
greater number of individuals.  Accepting the argument that the discrimination is 
justifiable on the basis of slight interference with an individuals rights balanced 
against the significant benefits for society also leads us closer to a comprehensive 
database for all persons. There is no doubt that such a database would have huge 
benefits in respect of crime detection and protection of society but, as Sedley LJ 
indicates, there would be a price to pay in respect of the invasion of privacy and the 
intrusion and surveillance involved in setting up and maintaining such a database.  
 
Having recognised there is concern amongst the public at such retention, it is 
necessary to consider whether the concern is reasonable and whether despite that 
concern the government should have expanded the law. The Court of Appeal 
addressed a number of concerns raised by Liberty. Liberty’s primary concern was not 
the retention of DNA profiles, which reveal limited information, but the retention of 
samples. As science progresses we are able to obtain more and more information from 
samples and it is impossible to predict precisely what personal details could, in the 
future, be extracted and used. The amended s.64 provides that fingerprints, samples 
and information derived from such samples may be used for purposes related to the 
prevention or detection of crime. This gives an extremely wide discretion particularly 
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as we are not able to predict what information might be available in the future. Waller 
LJ addressed Liberty’s concerns indicating that the benefits of retaining samples, 
primarily relating to reanalysis to check for errors and to upgrade profiles as 
techniques develop, outweigh the potential risks. He also felt that the potential risks 
were not significant as any change in law or practice would need to be Convention 
compliant so providing a safeguard. To maintain a functional database that can 
develop as techniques develop it is undoubtedly necessary to retain samples as well as 
the DNA profiles. It is impossible to legislate for future scientific developments and 
to some extent we have to accept that the need to remain Convention compliant will 
help to ensure the wide discretion afforded by the amended s.64 will be exercised in 
an appropriate manner.  
 
Moving the dividing line, for retention of fingerprints and samples, from between 
those individuals convicted and those not convicted to between those who have had 
samples taken and those who have not may have significant ramifications. Accepting 
that there is discrimination could result in an expansion of the database in order to 
avoid discrimination; likewise justification of discrimination on the basis of slight 
interference with the individuals rights and significant benefit to the public could 
result in an expanded database. Risk of crime is part of a free society, greater 
monitoring of individuals can reduce the potential for crime and enhance detection, 
the difficulty is deciding where to draw the line. 
